Very recently, a (fuzzy modal) logic to reason about coherent conditional probability, in the sense of de Finetti, has been introduced by the authors. Under this approach, a conditional probability ðÁ j ÁÞ is taken as a primitive notion defined over conditional events of the form ''' given '', 'j for short, where is not the impossible event. The logic, called FCP(LÅ), exploits an idea already used by Hájek and colleagues to define a logic for (unconditional) probability in the framework of fuzzy logics. Namely, we take the probability of the conditional event '''j '' as the truth-value of the (fuzzy) modal proposition Pð' j Þ, read as '''j is probable''. The logic FCP(LÅ), which is built up over the many-valued logic LÅ 1 2 (a logic which combines the well-known Lukasiewicz and Product fuzzy logics), was shown to be complete for modal theories with respect to the class of probabilistic Kripke structures induced by coherent conditional probabilities. Indeed, checking coherence of a (generalized) probability assessment to an arbitrary family of conditional events becomes tantamount to checking consistency of a suitably defined theory over the logic FCP(LÅ). In this paper we provide further results for the logic FCP(LÅ). In particular, we extend the previous completeness result by allowing the presence of non-modal formulas in the theories, which are used to describe logical relationships among events. This increases the knowledge modelling power of FCP(LÅ). Then, we improve the results concerning checking consistency of suitably defined theories in FCP(LÅ) to determine coherence by showing parallel results w.r.t. the notion of generalized coherence when dealing with imprecise assessments. Moreover we also show and discuss compactness results for our logic. Finally, FCP(LÅ) is shown to be a powerful tool for knowledge representation. Indeed, following ideas already investigated in the related literature, we show how FCP(LÅ) allows the definition of suitable notions of default rules which enjoy the core properties of nonmonotonic reasoning characterizing system P and R.
formalisms present some kind of probabilistic operators but all of them, with the exception of [18] , are based on the classical two valued-logic.
An alternative treatment, originally proposed in [23] and further elaborated in [22] and in [20] , allows the axiomatization of uncertainty measures in the framework of fuzzy logic. The basic idea is to consider, for each classical (two-valued) proposition ', a (fuzzy) modal proposition P', which reads ''' is probable'', and taking as truth-degree of P' the probability of '. Then one can define theories about the P''s over a particular fuzzy logic including, as axioms, formulas corresponding to the basic postulates of probability theory. The advantage of such an approach, with respect to the previously mentioned ones, is that algebraic operations needed to compute with probabilities (or with any other uncertainty model) are embedded in the connectives of the many-valued logical framework, resulting in clear and elegant formalizations.
In reasoning with probability, a crucial issue concerns the notion of conditional probability. Traditionally, given a probability measure on an algebra of possible worlds W, if the agent observes that the actual world is in A W , then the updated probability measure ðÁ j AÞ, called conditional probability, is defined as ðB j AÞ ¼ ðB \ AÞ=ðAÞ, provided that ðAÞ > 0. If ðAÞ ¼ 0 the conditional probability remains then undefined. This yields both philosophical and logical problems. For instance, in [20] where the logic FP(LÅ) is presented, conditional probability statements are handled by formulas Pð' j Þ which denote an abbreviation for P ! Å Pð'^ Þ. Such a definition exploits the properties of Product logic implication ! Å , whose truth function behaves like a truncated division:
eðÈ ! Å ÉÞ ¼ 1, if eðÈÞ eðÉÞ eðÉÞ=eðÈÞ, otherwise:
However, with such a logical modelling, whenever the probability of the conditioning event is 0, Pð' j Þ takes as truth-value 1. Therefore, this yields problems when dealing with zero probabilities. Two well-known proposals which aim at solving this problem consist in either adopting a non-standard probability approach (where events are measured on the hyper-real interval [0, 1] rather than on the usual real interval), or in taking conditional probability as a primitive notion. In the first case [26, 28, 33] , the assignment of zero probability is only allowed to impossible events, while other events can take on an infinitesimal probability. This clearly permits to avoid situations in which the conditioning event has null probability. The second approach (that goes back to de Finetti, Rényi and Popper among others) considers conditional probability and conditional events as basic notions, not derived from the notion of unconditional probability, and provides adequate axioms. Coletti and Scozzafava's book [10] includes a rich elaboration of different issues of reasoning with coherent conditional probability, i.e. conditional probability in de Finetti's sense. We take from there the following definition.
DEFINITION 1.1 ([10])
Let G be a Boolean algebra and let B G be closed with respect to finite unions (additive set). Let B 0 ¼ B n f;g. A conditional probability on the set G Â B 0 of conditional events, denoted as EjH , is a function : G Â B 0 ! ½0; 1 satisfying the following axioms:
(1) ðH j H Þ ¼ 1, for all H 2 B 0 (2) ðÁ j H Þ is a (finitely additive) probability on G for any given H 2 B 0 (3) ðE \ A j H Þ ¼ ðE j H Þ Á ðA j E \ H Þ, for all A 2 G and E, H , E \ H 2 B 0 .
Two different logical treatments based respectively on the above two solutions have been recently proposed, both using a fuzzy logic approach as the one mentioned above. In fact, they both define probability logics over the fuzzy logic LÅ 1 2 , which combines the well-known Lukasiewicz and Product fuzzy logics. In [15] Flaminio and Montagna introduced the logic FP(SLÅ) whose models include non-standard probabilities. On the other hand, we introduced in [36] the logic FCP(LÅ) in whose models conditional probability is a primitive notion. FCP(LÅ) is equipped with a modal operator P directly defined over conditional events of the form 'j. Unconditional probability, then, arises as non-primitive whenever the conditioning event is a (classical) tautology. The obvious reading of a statement like Pð' j Þ is ''the conditional event ''' given '' is probable''. Similarly to the case mentioned above, the truth-value of Pð' j Þ is given by the conditional probability ð' j Þ. A completeness result of FCP(LÅ) with respect to a class of Kripke structures suitably equipped with a conditional probability is shown in [36] . Moreover, it is also shown that checking the coherence of an assessment to a family of conditional events, in the sense of de Finetti, Coletti and Scozzafava 1 , is tantamount to checking consistency 2 of a suitably defined theory in FCP(LÅ).
In this paper, after this introduction, we provide in the next section the necessary background notions about the fuzzy logic LÅ 1 2 . In the third and fourth sections we present the logic FCP(LÅ), we review its semantics, solving some technical problems in [36] , and we enhance the completeness result given in [36] . Indeed, in that paper completeness was proved with respect to (finite) modal theories, i.e. theories only including modal (probabilistic) formulas. Although they are the most interesting kind of formulas, this clearly restricted the type of deductions allowed. In Section 4, we provide completeness results for general (finite) theories, i.e. theories including both modal and non-modal formulas, and adapted to the modified semantics. This will allow to represent logical relationships between events in the theories. In Section 5, we will be concerned with coherence of both precise and imprecise assessments of conditional probability. Starting from the result in [36] which makes explicit the link between coherence of rational assessments and theories in our logic, we prove that such a result can be generalized so as to deal with imprecise assessments of probability, i.e. all those situations in which we cannot provide but lower (or upper) bounds for the assessments. We also see how to capture the concepts of lower and upper coherent conditional probabilities presented in [10] under our framework. Moreover, in Section 6 we generalize a result obtained by Flaminio [16] on the compactness of our logic for coherent assessments, and we discuss a different approach to obtain similar compactness results. To conclude, in Section 7 we show that FCP(LÅ) is a powerful tool from the knowledge representation point of view. Indeed, many complex statements, both quantitative and qualitative, concerning conditional probabilities can be represented, as well as suitable notions of default rules which capture the core properties of nonmonotonic reasoning carved in system P and in some extension. 1 Roughly speaking, an assessment to an arbitrary family of conditional events is called coherent when it can be extended to a whole conditional probability [10] . 2 Notice that this is just a formal equivalence with no aim of providing a study of computational complexity of the coherence test of conditional probabilities. The language of the LÅ logic is built in the usual way from a countable set of propositional variables, three binary connectives ! L (Lukasiewicz implication), (Product conjunction) and ! Å (Product implication), and the truth constant " 0. A truth-evaluation is a mapping e that assigns to every propositional variable a real number from the unit interval [0, 1] and extends to all formulas as follows:
The truth constant 1 is defined as ' ! L '. In this way we have eð1Þ ¼ 1 for any truthevaluation e. Moreover, many other connectives can be defined from those introduced above:
with the following interpretations:
The logic LÅ is defined Hilbert-style as the logical system whose axioms and rules are the following 3 :
(1) Axioms of Lukasiewicz Logic:
This definition, proposed in [8] , is actually a simplified version of the original definition of LÅ given in [11] . 4 Actually Product logic axioms also include axiom A7 [ " 0 ! Å '] which is redundant in LÅ.
The following additional axioms relating Lukasiewicz and Product logic connectives:
Deduction rules of LÅ are modus ponens for ! L (modus ponens for ! Å is derivable), and necessitation for Á: from ' derive Á':
The logic LÅ 1 2 is the logic obtained from LÅ by expanding the language with a propositional variable 1 2 and adding the axiom:
Obviously, a truth-evaluation e for LÅ is easily extended to an evaluation for LÅ From the above axiom systems, the notion of proof from a theory (a set of formulas) in both logics, denoted ' LÅ and ' LÅ 1 2 respectively, is defined as usual. Strong completeness of both logics for finite theories with respect to the given semantics has been proved in [11] . In what follows we will restrict ourselves to the logic LÅ ' iff eð'Þ ¼ 1 for each truth-evaluation e which is a model 5 of T.
As it is also shown in [11] , for each rational r 2 ½0, 1 a formula r is definable in LÅ 
r s r Á s, ðRLÅ4Þ r ! Å s r ) P s, where r ) P s ¼ 1 if r s, r ) P s ¼ s=r otherwise.
A logic of conditional probability
In this section we describe the fuzzy modal logic FCP(LÅ) -FCP for Fuzzy Conditional Probability-, built up over the many-valued logic LÅ In what follows, given a set D & L of non-modal formulas, we will denote by Con(D) the 5 We say that an evaluation e is a model of a theory T whenever eð Þ ¼ 1 for each 2 T.
set of non-modulas formulas ' which follow from D in Classical propositional logic. Furthermore, TautðLÞ & L will denote the set of classical tautologies and SatðLÞ & L the set of (classically) satisfiable formulas. In other words, TautðLÞ ¼ Conð;Þ and SatðLÞ ¼ f' j :' 6 2 Conð;Þg.
The language of FCP(LÅ) is defined in two steps:
Non-modal formulas: they are built from a set V of propositional variables fp 1 , p 2 , : . . . p n , . . .g using the classical binary connectives^and :. Other connectives like _, ! and $ are defined from^and : in the usual way. Non-modal formulas (we will also refer to them as Boolean propositions) will be denoted by lower case Greek letters ', , etc. The set of non-modal formulas will be denoted by L.
Modal formulas: they are built from elementary modal formulas of the form Pð' j Þ, where ' and are non-modal formulas with 2 SatðLÞ, using the connectives of LÅ (! L , &, , ! Å , etc.) and the truth constants r, for each rational r 2 ½0, 1. We shall denote them by upper case Greek letters È, É, etc. Notice that we do not allow nested modalities. 
Deduction rules of FCP(LÅ) are those of LÅ (i.e. modus ponens and necessitation for Á), plus: (4) necessitation for P: from ' derive Pð' j Þ (5) substitution of equivalents for the conditioning proposition: from $ 0 , derive Pð' j Þ Pð' j 0 Þ
REMARK
The restriction imposed in the definition of elementary modal formulas that in a formula Pð' j Þ must belong to SatðLÞ is implicitly assumed in all the above axiom schemes and rules.
Due to the peculiar definition of the language, any theory (set of formulas) will be of the kind
where D contains only non-modal formulas and T contains only modal formulas. Notice that in the above axioms and rules, there is no interplay between both kinds of formulas except for the inference rules of necessitation and substitution of equivalents, which allow the derivation of modal formulas from non-modal ones (but not vice-versa). Therefore, given an initial theory À ¼ D [ T, reasoning on non-modal formulas does not play an actual role in deductions from À, but it is just a way of generating new modal formulas to be considered with T. On the other hand, in proofs from À, we want to avoid the application of the above inference rules yielding modal formulas with conditioning events contradictory with D, since they would easily lead to inconsistencies. As an example, if D ¼ f:pg, where p is a propositional variable, then from D one could derive Pð:p j pÞ by applying the necessitation rule, which is in clear contradiction with Pðp j pÞ, an instance of axiom (FCP5). Therefore, we are led to define in FCP(LÅ) the notion of proof from a theory, written ' FCP , in a non standard way, at least when the theory contains non-modal formulas. In what follows D denotes a propositional theory, T a modal theory, ' a non-modal formula and È a modal formula.
DEFINITION 3.2
The proof relation ' FCP between sets of formulas and formulas is defined by:
T in the usual way from the above axioms and rules.
where D P ¼ fPð' j Þ : ' 2 ConðDÞ, : 6 2 ConðDÞ and appears as conditioning in subformulas of Èg Notice that the general lateral condition for all modal formulas that 2 SatðLÞ, as well as the conditions ' 2 ConðDÞ and : 6 2 ConðDÞ for the consequence relation, are decidable, so the notion of proof is well-defined.
EXAMPLE 3.3
As an example of deduction, we show how to prove that conditional probability preserves classical equivalence, i.e. that ' $ ' FCP Pð' j Þ Pð j Þ, where 2 SatðLÞ.
P , hence we derive it. Now, since ð' $ Þ ! ð' ! Þ is a Boolean tautology, by necessitation we obtain Pðð' $ Þ ! ð' ! Þ j Þ. By applying FCP1 and modus ponens with Pð' $ j Þ we derive Pð' ! j Þ, and again by FCP1 and modus ponens we get Pð'jÞ ! L Pð jÞ. Similarly, starting from ð' $ Þ ! ð ! 'Þ, we derive Pð jÞ ! L Pð'jÞ as well. Finally, by reasoning in LÅ we derive ðPð'jÞ ! L Pð jÞÞ&ðPð jÞ ! L Pð'jÞÞ, hence we have shown ' $ ' FCP Pð' j Þ Pð j Þ.
The semantics for FCP(LÅ) is given by conditional probability Kripke structures M ¼ hW , U, e, i, where:
W is a non-empty set of possible worlds. e : V Â W ! f0, 1g provides for each world a Boolean (two-valued) evaluation of the propositional variables, that is, eðp, wÞ 2 f0, 1g for each propositional variable p 2 V and each world w 2 W . A truth-evaluation eðÁ, wÞ is extended to Boolean propositions as usual. For a Boolean formula ', we will write ½' W ¼ fw 2 W j eð', wÞ ¼ 1g.
: U Â U 0 ! ½0, 1 is a conditional probability over U Â U 0 , where U is a Boolean algebra of subsets of W 6 , U 0 ¼ Unf;g, and such that ð½' W , ½ W Þ is -measurable for all non-modal ' and (with ½ W 6 ¼ ;). eðÁ, wÞ is extended to elementary modal formulas by defining
Notice that in our definition the factors of the Cartesian product are the same Boolean algebra. This is clearly a special case of what is stated in Definition 1.1. and we leave eðPð' j Þ, wÞ undefined otherwise 7 . Then e is extended to arbitrary modal formulas, when possible, according to LÅ We call a Kripke structure M ¼ hW , U, e, i safe for a formula È if eðÈ, wÞ is defined for every world w. Trivially, any Kripke structure is safe for all non-modal formulas. If È is modal and M is safe for it, then observe that the truth-evaluation eðÈ, wÞ depends only on the conditional probability measure and not on the particular world w. In this case, we will also write e M ðÈÞ to denote eðÈ, wÞ for any w 2 W. If M is safe for È, then we say that M is a model for È, written M È, if e M ðÈÞ ¼ 1. If T is a set of formulas, we say that M is a model of T if M is safe for all formulas in T and M È for all È 2 T.
is safe for a modal formula È iff M is so for every elementary modal subformula of È.
The notion of logical entailment relative to a class of structures M, written M , is then defined as follows:
If M denotes the whole class of conditional probability Kripke structures we shall write T FCP È. When M È holds we will say that È is valid in M, i.e. when È gets value 1 in all structures M 2 M safe for È. PROOF. The proof is very similar to the one given in [22] (8.4.5) for unconditional probability. Let M ¼ ðW , U, e, Þ be a conditional probability structure which we will subsequently assume below to be safe for the different formulas corresponding to (instances of) the axioms. 7 This possibility of having the evaluation of a modal formula as undefined, and its consequences, was missing in [36] .
Then it is easy to check that the validity of each axiom in M amounts to a corresponding property of : (FCP3), (FCP4) and (FCP5) directly correspond to the three axioms of conditional probability given in Definition 1.1. Actually, the validity of (FCP3) amounts to the additivity of ðÁ j ½ W Þ. The cases of (FCP4) and (FCP5) are obvious. The case of (FCP2) is also a consequence of the additivity of ðÁ j ½ W Þ. As for (FCP1), if we simply write ð' j Þ for ð½' W j ½ W Þ and x ) y for minð1 À x þ y, 1Þ, it amounts to check ð'
The FCP(LÅ) inference rules preserve validity in a model.
PROOF. We need to check that the rule of substitution of equivalents and the necessitation rule for P preserve validity in a model. Namely, let M ¼ ðW , U, e, Þ be such that M $ 0 and M is safe for Pð' j Þ and Pð' j 0 Þ. Then, ½ W ¼ ½ 0 W 6 ¼ ; and hence obviously eðPð' j Þ, wÞ ¼ eðPð' j 0 Þ, wÞ for all w 2 W , that is, M Pð' j Þ Pð' j 0 Þ. As for the necessitation rule, if we assume M ' and M is safe for
The two preceeding lemmas are the basis for the following soundness result.
PROPOSITION 3.5 (Soundness)
The logic FCP(LÅ) is sound with respect to the class of conditional probability Kripke
PROOF. Assume À ' FCP È and recall Definition 3.2. If È is non-modal it is obvious, thus assume È is modal. Now, let us assume À to be modal. Then, by lemmas 3.4 and 3.5, we also have 
Extended completeness for FCP(LÅ)
The completeness result for FCP(LÅ) shown in [36] only considers (finite) modal theories, that is, theories involving only probabilistic formulas. However it is worth considering theories also including non-modal formulas since they can allow us to take into account logical representations of the relationships between events. For instance, if ' and represent incompatible events, we may want to include in our probabilistic theory the non-modal formula :ð'^ Þ, or if the event represented by is included in ' then we may need to include the formula ! '.
Let D & L be any given non-modal (propositional) theory (possibly empty). For any Abusing the language, we will say that a conditional probability 2 CPðDÞ is a model of a modal theory T whenever the induced Kripke structure
Given the above notions, we now prove the probabilistic completeness of FCP(LÅ) with respect to finite arbitrary theories, hence extending the result given in [36] for modal theories. PROOF. Soundness is clear (see Proposition 3.6). For completeness, the proof below is an adaptation of the proof of [36, Th.2], which in turn follows [20, 22] . The basic idea consists in transforming modal theories over FCP(LÅ) into theories over LÅ propositions from L and 2 SatðLÞ (2) take as axioms of the theory the following ones, for each ', and :
(F 1) f 'j , for ' 2 ConðDÞ and such that : 6 2 ConðDÞ. (F 2) f 'j f 'j 0 , for any , 0 2 such that :, : 0 6 2 ConðDÞ, $ 0 2 ConðDÞ
where in all formulas of the kind f 'j , it is assumed that 2 SatðLÞ.
Define a mapping Ã from FCP(LÅ) modal formulas to LÅ 1 2 -formulas as follows:
Needless to say, if the language has only finitely many propositional variables then the algebra Bð D Þ is just the whole power set of D , otherwise it is a strict subalgebra.
Let us denote by T* and ðD P Þ Ã the set of all translated formulas from T and D P respectively. Then, by the construction of F and ðD P Þ Ã , one can easily check that for any È,
Notice that in a proof from T Ã [ F [ ðD P Þ Ã the use of instances of ðF 1Þ and ðF 2Þ corresponds to the use of inference rules of necessitation for P and of substitution of equivalents in FCP(LÅ), while instances of ðF 3Þ À ðF 7Þ obviously correspond to axioms (FCP1) -(FCP5) respectively. Now we prove that the semantical analogue of (1) also holds, that is, 
for each ', 2 L such that : 6 2 ConðDÞ (hence ½ D 6 ¼ ;). e 0 ðp, wÞ ¼ wðpÞ for each propositional variable p
Since by hypothesis e is a model of F , it is easy to see that e is indeed a conditional probability. Moreover, so defined, M e is clearly a model of D, it is safe for all formulas of T [ fÈg (because of the precondition in the theorem) and moreover, by construction, e 0 ðÉ, wÞ ¼ eðÉ Ã Þ for any modal formula É 2 T [ fÈg, hence e 0 ðÉ, wÞ ¼ 1 for all É 2 T and eðÈ, wÞ < 1. Thus, M e T but M e 6 È.
Conversely, assume T [ D 6 FCP È, that is, assume there is a conditional probability Kripke structure M ¼ ðW , U, e, Þ which is a model of T [ D (hence safe for T), safe for È but M 6 È. Thus, M is also a model of D P since for each Pð' j Þ 2 D P , ½' W ¼ W and ½ W 6 ¼ ; and hence ð½' W j ½ W Þ ¼ 1. We show that there also exists an LÅ Coherent conditional probability in a fuzzy logic setting 11
From (1) and (2), to prove the theorem it remains to show that
Note that LÅ 1 2 is strongly complete but only for finite theories. Here the initial theories T and D are finite, so is T Ã . However F contains infinitely many instances of axioms F 1 À F 7 and ðD P Þ Ã also contains infinitely many formulas since Con(D) is so. Nonetheless one can prove that such infinitely many formulas can be safely replaced by only finitely many, by using propositional normal forms, following the lines of [22, 8.4.12] .
Indeed, take n propositional variables p 1 , . . . , p n containing at least all variables in T [ D. For any formula ' built from these propositional variables, take the corresponding disjunctive normal form ð'Þ dnf . Notice that there are only finitely many different such formulas. Then, when translating a modal formula È into È Ã , we replace each atom f 'j by f ð'Þ dnf jðÞ dnf to obtain its normal translation È The theory F dnf is the finite set of instances of axioms F 1 À F 7 for disjunctive normal forms of Boolean formulas built from the propositional variables p 1 , . . . , p n . We can now prove the following equivalences:
The proof of (i) and (ii) is similar to that provided in [22, 8.4.13] . Finally, we obtain the following chain of equivalences:
This completes the proof of the theorem. g
Similarly to the case of modal theories (see [36] ), we have the following interesting types of deduction. If T is a finite (modal) conditional theory over FCP(LÅ), D is a propositional (non-modal) theory, and ' and are non-modal formulas, with : 6 2 ConðDÞ, then we have:
r iff ð' j Þ r, for each conditional probability 2 CPðDÞ model of T.
EXAMPLE 4.2
As examples of interesting deductions with propositional theories, consider the following ones.
-! ' ' FCP Pð' j Þ, for 2 SatðLÞ.
Indeed, by the necessitation rule ! ' ' FCP Pð ! ' j Þ, and by axiom (FCP1), ' ! ' FCP Pð j Þ ! L Pð' j Þ. Finally, using axiom (FCP5) and modus ponens we get ! ' ' FCP Pð' j Þ. -Let T be a probabilistic theory. If T ' Pð' j ^Þ then T [ fg ' FCP Pð' j Þ. In fact, assume T ' FCP Pð' j ^Þ, hence T [ fg ' FCP Pð' j ^Þ as well. Clearly, by the necessitation rule T [ fg ' FCP Pð j Þ, and now by axiom (FCP4) T [ fg ' FCP Pð'^ j Þ. Since '^ ! ' is a Boolean tautology, by the necessitation rule we have ' FCP Pð'^ ! ' j Þ, and by axiom (FCP1) and modus ponens we get ' FCP Pð'^ j Þ ! L Pð' j Þ, and finally by modus ponens with Pð'^ j Þ we get T [ fg ' FCP Pð' j Þ.
5 Consistency, coherent assessments and lower conditional probability
Following de Finetti's research, one of the most important features of the conditional probability approach developed by Coletti and Scozzafava in [10] is based on the possibility of reasoning only from partial conditional probability assessments to an arbitrary family of conditional events (without requiring in principle any specific algebraic structure). However, it must be checked whether such assessments minimally agree with the rules of conditional probability. This consists in requiring that an assessment can be extended at least to a proper conditional probability over U Â U 0 , where U is the whole Boolean algebra generated by those conditional events, and it is called coherence.
First of all, we need to stress out the relationship between Coletti and Scozzafava's framework and our logical framework FCP(LÅ). In [10] , the authors use a settheoretical language and speak about conditional events as pairs of the form EjH , where E and H are basically considered as sets in a (possibly indeterminate) Boolean algebra. Here we model conditional events as pairs 'j where ' and are propositions. So, when dealing with sets of conditional events, possibly implicit relationships between (simple) events as sets (e.g. inclusion, incompatibility) need to be explicitly modelled in our framework in a separate way by means of a set of formulas relating the propositions defining the conditional objects. Accordingly, a family of conditional events in [10] 's framework corresponds to a family C ¼ f' i j i g i2I of conditional objects together with an associated propositional theory D C standing for the (possible) logical relationships among the ' i 's and i 's (see Example 5.3). As usual, we also assume that the conditioning propositions i 's are not in contradiction with the theory D C , i.e. we assume : i 6 2 ConðD C Þ for all i 2 I . In what follows we will exploit this parallelism to rephrase some results of [10] in our language.
DEFINITION 5.1 (Coherence [10])
A probabilistic assessment : C ! ½0, 1 over a family of conditional events C ¼ f' i j i : i ¼ 1, . . . , ng is coherent if there is a conditional probability on Bð½D C Þ Â Bð½D C Þ 0 , in the sense of Definition 1.1, such that ð'
An important result by Coletti and Scozzafava is the characterization of the coherence of an assessment in terms of the existence of a suitable class of simple (non-conditional) coherent probabilities. Indeed, it is shown in [10] that given a set of conditional events, any coherent assessment over such a set can be represented by a family of classical conditional probabilities each of them generated by a class of simple assessments, each one defined over subsets of the atoms of the algebra (see [10, Th. 4 
]).
In [36] we showed that the notion of coherence of a probabilistic assessment (restricted to rational values) to a set of conditional events is tantamount to the consistency of a suitably defined theory over FCP(LÅ) 9 .
THEOREM 5.2 ([36])
Let be a rational assessment to a family of conditional events C ¼ f'
Suppose you are calling your friend Sally at her cell phone and consider the following events:
': Sally hears the phone ringing Sally is out : The cell phone is at home : Sally answers the call You know Sally's apartment is small so it is easy for her to hear the phone when ringing, and it is usually the case that if she does not answer it is because she has forgotten to take the cell phone when she is going out. This allows you, considering the set of conditional events C ¼ f'j: , ^j:g, to make the following conditional probability assessment : C ! ½0, 1, with ð' j : Þ ¼ 0:9, ð ^ j :Þ ¼ 0:7. On the other hand, it is clear that if Sally is out, and she has left her cell phone at home, she cannot hear the phone ringing, and hence she cannot answer the call either. In other words, this means that if and are true logically implies that ' cannot be true, and this in turn implies that that cannot be true. All this information is modelled in our logic FCP(LÅ) by both the modal theory T ¼ fPð' j : Þ 0:9, Pð ^ j :Þ 0:7g and the propositional theory
the latter making explicit the implicit relationships among the events (assuming these are all we know). The coherence of the assessment is then equivalent to the consistency of the theory T [ D C in the logic FCP(LÅ), i.e. to the fact that T [ D C 6 ' FCP 0. Notice that the consideration of the non-modal theory D C together with the probabilistic (modal) theory T is very important, for instance from T [ D C , we can derive in FCP(LÅ) formulas like Pð' j :Þ ! L 0:3 or Pð j : Þ ! L 0:9, which we cannot derive from T alone.
Sometimes, we might not be able to assess precise conditional probability values for a family of conditional events, but we can rather provide just a vector of lower (or upper) bounds for those values. In such situations where we have to deal with imprecise 9 A very similar result was provided by Flaminio and Montagna in [15] in the framework of their logic FP(SLÅ).
assessments of probabilities, the notion of coherence has been naturally generalized by Biazzo and Gilio 10 .
. . , ' n j n g be a family of conditional events. A probabilistic assessment of lower values : C ! ½0, 1 on C is said to be g-coherent iff there exists a (precise) coherent assessment : C ! ½0, 1 which is consistent with , that is, such that ð' i j i Þ ! ð' i j i Þ for each i.
The above definition also works when dealing with upper bounds and with intervals. Indeed, for any conditional event 'j, such that ð'jÞ , we have the inequality ð:'jÞ ! 1 À . Therefore, we can determine g-coherence in the presence of interval-valued assessments ð' i j i Þ ¼ ½ i , i standing for constraints of the type
In the following theorem we prove that the generalized coherence of any imprecise rational assessment of conditional probabilities coincides with the consistency of a suitably defined theory over FCP(LÅ). In the following I½0, 1 denotes the set of closed intervals in ½0, 1.
THEOREM 5.5 Let g : C ! I½0, 1, be a rational generalized probabilistic assessment on a family
PROOF. Suppose T g is consistent. Then, by completeness of FCP(LÅ), the class of models of
Conversely, suppose that g is g-coherent. Then, there exists a conditional probability on
. This probability induces a probabilistic Kripke structure h D C , Bð D C Þ, e , i that is a model of T g . g
Finally, let us remark that in [10] the authors also deal with the notion of coherent lower and upper conditional probability. Given an arbitrary set C of conditional events, a coherent lower (upper) conditional probability on C is an assessment : C ! ½0, 1 (resp. an assessment : C ! ½0, 1) such that there exists a non-empty dominating family P ¼ fðÁjÁÞg of coherent conditional probabilities on C whose lower (resp. upper) envelope is (resp. ), that is, for every 'j 2 C,
Moreover, they show that if C is finite, there exists a dominating family P 0 P such that
These notions also have a 10 Notice that the notion of coherence used in [4, 19] is actually given in terms of random gains using de Finetti's betting scheme, but shown to be equivalent to the ones given in Definitions 5.1 and 5.4. corresponding representation in FCP(LÅ). Indeed, given a finite modal theory T and a propositional theory D, one can compute in FCP(LÅ), for each conditional object 'j , the greatest lower bound and the lowest upper bound for the coherent probability values induced by T [ D. Indeed, let
It is not difficult to check that and are coherent lower and upper probabilities in the above sense. By the finite strong completeness of LÅ 1 2 , when the above infimum and supremum are rational numbers, they actually become a minimum and a maximum respectively. In such a case it then holds
where ¼ ð'j Þ and ¼ ð'j Þ.
Compactness of coherent assessments
Very recently, Flaminio has shown [16] the compactness of coherent probabilistic assessments to conditional events, both under Flaminio and Montagna's probabilistic logic FP(SLÅ) and under our logic FCP(LÅ). In particular, for FCP(LÅ), he provides the following theorem. THEOREM 6.1 (Compactness) Let us consider a modal theory T ¼ fPð' i j i Þ i g i2I over FCP(LÅ). Then T is satisfiable iff every finite subtheory of T is satisfiable.
The proof is based on the well-known theorems of Los on the ultraproduct model and on the related theorem of compactness. Roughly speaking, what Los shows is how to define a model for an arbitrary set of formulas out of models of their finite subsets. Particularized to our framework, Los' theorem reads as follows. THEOREM 6.2 (cf. [7] ) Let À be an arbitrary theory over FCP(LÅ). Let S ! ðÀÞ ¼ fT i g i2I be the (countable) set of all finite subtheories of À, and for every i 2 I, let M i be a conditional probabilistic Kripke structure model of T i . Then, there exists an ultrafilter 11 F over I such that the ultraproduct structure 12 
This result would directly lead to the compactness of consistency in FCP(LÅ) if the ultraproduct model ð Q i2I M i Þ=F was a conditional probabilistic Kripke structure of the class. Unfortunately, the class of conditional probabilistic Kripke structures is not 11 Recall that, given a non-empty set S, an ultrafilter F over S is a collection of subsets of S such that ; 2 F; if A; B 2 F then A \ B 2 F; if A 2 F and A B, then B 2 F; and for each A S, either A 2 F or A c 2 F.
closed under ultraproduct. Indeed, if M i ¼ ðW i , U i , i , e i Þ then the ultraproduct structure ð Q i2I M i Þ=F is a structure ðW , U, Ã , eÞ, where:
Ã is a non-standard conditional probability, where ½0, 1 Ã denotes the ultrapower of ½0, 1 modulo F , and Ã ðA j BÞ is defined as the F -equivalence class of
However, as Flaminio shows, by letting be the standard part of the non-standard conditional probability Ã , the structure ðW , U, , eÞ becomes a (standard) conditional probabilistic Kripke structure which is still model of À. Now, it is not difficult to check that Flaminio's proof also works for more general kinds of theories involving LÅ PROOF. Left-to-right direction is easy. To prove the converse, suppose that every finite subtheory T i of T is satisfiable. Then, for any T i there exists some model M i such that M i T i . Then, by the above Los theorem 6.2 there exists an ultrafilter F such that Q i2I M i =F T. However, as mentioned, the model obtained is based on a non-standard probability Ã , so is the evaluation e Ã . Still, like in [16] we can get a standard model by recovering the standard part, so if St denotes the standard part, we define eðÈÞ ¼ Stðe Ã ðÈÞÞ. Then eðÈ ÉÞ ¼ Stðe Ã ðÈ ÉÞÞ ¼ Stðe Ã ðÈÞÞ Stðe Ã ðÉÞÞ, for 2 f&, ! L , g. The respect of the behavior of the connectives is guaranteed by the continuity of their related truthfunctions. Then the ''standardized'' structure conserves the necessary requirements for being a model of T. g A parallel result for Flaminio and Montagna's logic FP(SLÅ) also holds. Following the above strategy we can also prove compactness for generalized coherence [4, 19] . This corresponds to state compactness of coherence for interval-valued conditional probability assessments of the kind
which amounts in turn to compactness for the consistency of the theory
Now, given Theorem 6.3, we directly have as a consequence the following corollary. COROLLARY 6.4
be a modal theory in FCP(LÅ). Then T is consistent iff every finite subtheory of T is consistent.
This corollary clearly yields as a direct consequence the following result of compactness for generalized coherent probabilistic assessments to conditional events (in e.g. [10] such a result is mentioned for single-valued coherent assessments).
THEOREM 6.5 (Compactness of Imprecise Coherent Assessments) Let g : C ! I½0, 1 be an imprecise assessment of conditional probability over a class of conditional events C ¼ f' i j i g i2I with rational bounds, i.e. for each i 2 I , if
These compactness results directly refer to the probabilistic logics FCP(LÅ) and FP(SLÅ) without mentioning a possible similar result for the base logic LÅ 1 2 . A study of compactness of many fuzzy logics was presented by Cintula and Navara in [9] . The notion of satisfiability proposed there generalizes the classical one, since it admits various degrees of simultaneous satisfiability. DEFINITION 6.6 ([9] ) For a set À of formulas in a fuzzy logic and K ½0, 1, we say that À is K-satisfiable is there exists an evaluation e such that eð'Þ 2 K for all ' 2 À: The set À is said to be finitely K-satisfiable if each finite subset of À is K-satisfiable. A logic is said to be K-compact if K-satisfiability is equivalent to finite K-satisfiability. A logic satisfies the compactness property if it is K-compact for each closed subset K of [0, 1].
In particular Cintula and Navara comment that the same proof they provide for the compactness of Lukasiewicz logic (originally proved by Butnariu, Klement and Zafrany [6] ) also works for other fuzzy logics with connectives interpreted by continuous functions. THEOREM 6.7 ([9, 6] ) Let L be any fuzzy logic whose connectives only have continuous truth-functions. Then L has the compactness property.
The proof in [9] runs as follows. Assume the language of L is built from a countable set Var of propositional variables. Let À a theory over L such that every finite subset À 0 is K-satisfiable. For each ' 2 À; define H ' : ½0, 1
Var ! ½0, 1 by H ' ðeÞ ¼ eð'Þ, which is continuous by hypothesis. Then H À1 ' ðKÞ is a closed subset of ½0, 1
Var , which is compact in the product topology. Since À 0 is K-satisfiable, the intersection \ '2À 0 H À1 ' ðKÞ is non-empty for every finite À 0 & À, hence by compactness of ½0,
' ðKÞ is non-empty as well. Then any evaluation e in this intersection is such that eð'Þ 2 K for all ' 2 À: Since the important point in the proof is that the functions H ' are continuous, the following corollary is a direct consequence of the above theorem. COROLLARY 6.8 Let T be a theory in a given fuzzy logic L whose formulas only involve connectives having continuous truth-functions. Then the compactness property holds w.r.t. T.
Such a corollary can be clearly applied to the continuous fragment of LÅ 1 2 . Now, considering that the completeness proof of FCP(LÅ) shows that one can translate a modal theory over FCP(LÅ) into a theory over LÅ 1 2 , we also obtain compactness results for modal (probabilistic) theories over FCP(LÅ) which do not involve the product implication connective ! Å . Therefore, all the above results concerning compactness can be proved also by relying on the fact that in such theories only continuous truth-functions are involved. Indeed, if T is any theory in FCP(LÅ) or in FP(SLÅ) such that product implication does not appear in T and each of its finite subtheories is satisfiable, the by the above corollary T itself is satisfiable. Such compactness is consequently transmitted to the respective probabilistic assessments, easily yielding then the above compactness results for simple and generalized conditional assessments.
Applications to knowledge representation
It is worth pointing out that the logic FCP(LÅ) is actually very powerful from a knowledge representation point of view. Indeed, it allows to express several kinds of statements about conditional probability, from purely comparative staments like ''the conditional event ' j is at least as probable as the conditional event j '' as
or numerical probability statements like -''the probability of ' j is 0.8'' as Pð' j Þ 0:8, -''the probability of ' j is at least 0.8'' as 0:8 ! L Pð' j Þ, -''the probability of ' j is at most 0.8'' as Pð' j Þ ! L 0:8, -''' j has positive probability'' as : Å : Å Pð' j Þ, or even staments about independence, like ''' and are independent given '' as
Another interesting issue is the possibility of modelling default reasoning by means of conditional events and probabilities. This has been largely explored in the literature. Actually, from a semantical point of view, the logical framework that FCP(LÅ) offers is very close to the so-called model-theoretic probabilistic logic in the sense of Biazzo et al's approach [5] , and the links established there to probabilistic reasoning under coherence and default reasoning 14 . Actually, FCP(LÅ) can provide a (syntactical) deductive system for such a rich framework.
Here, following the work on default reasoning proposed in [10] in the framework of coherent conditional probability, we show how to define over FCP(LÅ) a notion of default rule and default entailment using the deductive machinery of FCP(LÅ). First we introduce the basic notions for treating defaults w.r.t. coherent conditional probabilities. Then, we develop the related logical treatment, exploiting the tools provided by FCP(LÅ). These two approaches will be shown to be equivalent when we take into account only rational assessments. 14 See also [39] for another recent probabilistic logic approach to model defaults.
As stressed out above, in [10] the authors use a set-theoretical language and treat conditional events as pairs EjH , where E and H are basically considered as sets in a (possibly indeterminate) Boolean algebra. Here we model conditional events as pairs 'j where ' and are propositions. So, we model in our framework the implicit relationships between simple events by framing them into a set of formulas. Now, let be a coherent assessment of conditional probability on C. According to the above section this means that there exists at least one conditional probability on Bð 0 Þ Â Bð 0 Þ 0 , where
EðÞ be the set of coherent conditional probabilities extending . In this context, a conditional object 'j is called a default when the coherent assessment univocally determines that its probability is 1. DEFINITION 7.1 Given a coherent assessment over a class of conditional events C, a conditional object 'j is a default with respect to , written ; ', if for any 2 EðÞ we have ð' j Þ ¼ 1.
Actually, ; defines a consequence relation among events (propositional formulas) which, due to the possibility of coherent conditional probabilities of assigning zero probabilities to the conditioning events, enjoys the core properties of nonmonotonic reasoning characterizing the system P [10] of preferential entailment: We shift now to FCP(LÅ). Here, given a modal theory T and a propositional theory D, we define a default w.r.t. the pair ðT, DÞ, as any modal formula Pð' j Þ which follows from T [ D.
DEFINITION 7.2
Given a modal theory T and a propositional theory D over FCP(LÅ) a modal formula Pð' j Þ is a default with respect to
It is now easy to show that ; T, D is a preferential consequence relation (see e.g. [33] ). THEOREM 7.3 ; T, D is a preferential consequence relation, i.e. it satisfies the above six properties characterizing system P. It is easy to check that (1) holds by FCP5 and (2) by the substitution of equivalents rule. As for (3), by necessitation for P we have Pð' ! j Þ which, along with FCP1 and Pð' j Þ, by applying modus ponens, implies Pð j Þ.
As for (4), notice that ! ð ! ð ^ÞÞ 2 TautðLÞ. By necessitation for P we obtain ' FCP Pð ! ð ! ð ^ÞÞ j 'Þ. Now, by FCP1 and modus ponens (twice) we get ' FCP Pð j 'Þ ! L Pðð ! ^Þj'Þ and Pð j 'Þ ! L Pð ^ j 'Þ, hence fPð j 'Þ, Pð j 'Þg ' FCP Pð ^ j 'Þ.
As for (5), by FCP4 we have ' FCP Pð^ j 'Þ Pð j '^ Þ Pð j 'Þ, hence ' FCP Pð^ j 'Þ ! L Pð j '^ Þ Pð j 'Þ as well. By (4), fPð j 'Þ, Pð j 'Þg ' FCP Pð ^ j 'Þ, then by modus ponens, fPð j 'Þ, Pð j 'Þg ' FCP Pð j '^ Þ Pð j 'Þ, hence fPð j 'Þ, Pð j 'Þg ' FCP Pð j '^ Þ as well, since È É ! L È is a theorem of LÅ we also have ' FCP ðPð' j ' _ Þ ! L Pð j '^ Þ Pð'^ j ' _ ÞÞ ! L Pð j ' _ Þ. Finally, from this and (*) one can conclude that fPð j 'Þ, Pð j Þg ' FCP Pð j ' _ Þ, which proves (6) . g
We can define now a natural notion of default entailment. Let K ¼ f i ;' i g i2I be a conditional knowledge-base. We define a corresponding theory in FCP(LÅ) by putting T K ¼ fPð' i j i Þg i2I . DEFINITION 7.4 A default ; follows from K, written K '
As a direct consequence we have the following corollary.
COROLLARY 7.5
The inference rules of system P are sound w.r.t. ' Ã FCP . Now, due to FCP(LÅ)-probabilistic completeness, the notions of default for coherent assessments and defaults over FCP(LÅ) clearly are strictly related. Indeed they can be shown to be equivalent. However, once again, we must take into account only rational assessments, since we cannot represent reals in FCP(LÅ)-theories. The following results strengthen the idea that FCP(LÅ) strongly captures the concept of coherent conditional probability. THEOREM 7.6 Let C ¼ f' i j i g i2I be a finite family of conditional events, let be a rational coherent probability assessment on C. Define the following theory T ¼ fPð' i j i Þ i j i 2 I , i ¼ ð' i j i Þg over FCP(LÅ). Then the following condition holds:
; ' iff ; T, D C ':
PROOF. Suppose that ; '. This means that for any conditional probability 2 EðÞ, ð' j Þ ¼ 1. But, by definition, ; ' iff EðÞ is the set of probability models of T defined on Following Lehmann and Magidor's ideas [33] , we can also define rational consequence relations with coherent probabilistic semantics (actually, in [33] they use non-standard probabilistic models). So as to do it, we need to fix a single probabilistic Kripke structure M ¼ hW , U, , ei and then define the following consequence relation ; M on propositional (non-modal) formulas:
or equivalently, iff ð½ W j ½' W Þ ¼ 1 (assuming ½' W 6 ¼ ;). This consequence relation can be easily shown to be also a preferential relation, but moreover it can be shown to satisfy the further rational property: where the notation ' 6 ; M means that the pair ð', Þ is not in the consequence relation ; M , i.e. that M 6 Pð j 'Þ, i.e. that ð j 'Þ < 1. This is a consequence of the validity of the following derivation in FCP(LÅ): fPð j 'Þ, : L ÁPð: j 'Þg ' FCP Pð j '^Þ. Notice that Rational Monotonicity does not hold in general for the notion of default introduced in Definition 7.2.
Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated several aspects of the fuzzy modal logic FCP(LÅ) which allows reasoning about coherent conditional probability in the sense of de Finetti. To conclude, we would like to point out some open problems which deserve further investigations.
First, it remains to be studied whether we could use logics weaker than LÅ Second, we plan to study in more detail the links among FCP(LÅ) and different kinds of probabilistic nonmonotonic consequence relations as those defined by Lukasiewicz in [34, 35] . In fact, in that framework, a (strict or defeasible) conditional constraint ð j'Þ½l, u syntactically corresponds to the FCP(LÅ)-formula ðl ! L Pð j 'ÞÞ&ðPð j 'Þ ! L uÞ. We think FCP(LÅ) may provide a suitable framework where to define and compare the different notions of probabilistic default reasoning introduced in [35] . Finally, possible links to the very recent work by Arló-Costa and Parikh [2] on conditional probability and deafeasible reasoning deserve attention.
